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Here is a great video from Robert “RSnake” Hansen explaining what DNS Rebinding actually is and shows some various attacks that may be performed as a result of it. RSnake also explains what can be done to fix the problem and explains why it might not happen any time soon.
DNS Rebinding with Robert RSnake Hansen from Robert Hansen on Vimeo.
There’s nothing new about Windows trojans resorting to a little blackmail, but Computer Associates has now observed a new twist; a trojan which blocks internet access until the user enters an activation code. This is activation code is obtained by sending an SMS containing a particular number to an expensive premium rate phone number – CA does not mention the sum involved.
The malware, dubbed ‘Win32/RansomSMS.AH’, infects computers by claiming to be the “uFast Download Manager” tool which, when run, accuses users (in Russian) of having breached their licence conditions. CA has kindly provided a free tool (via zip direct download) to enable users to generate the required code for themselves.
Source:
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Trojan-demands-money-for-internet-access-873853.html
Web browsers enforce the same origin policy to prevent one site’s active content (such as JavaScript) from accessing or modifying another site’s data. For instance, active content hosted at http://
Clientless SSL VPNs provide browser-based access to internal and external resources without the need to install a traditional VPN client. Typically, these web VPNs are used to access intranet sites (such as an internal webmail server), but many have more capabilities, such as providing access to internal fileshares and remote desktop capabilities. To connect to a VPN, a web browser is used to authenticate to the web VPN, then the web VPN retrieves and presents the content from the requested pages.
Web VPN servers interact with clients using a process similar to what is described below:
1. The user presents credentials to the web VPN using a web browser. The authentication can be done through username and password submission, or can involve multi-factor authentication.
2. The web VPN authenticates the user and assigns an ID to the session, which is sent to the user’s browser in the form of a cookie.
3. The user can then browse internal resources, such as a webmail server or intranet webserver. URLs as viewed by the user’s web browser may be similar to https://
As the web VPN retrieves web pages, it rewrites hyperlinks so that they are accessible through the web VPN. For example, a link to http://
If an attacker constructs a page that obfuscates the document.cookie element in such a way as to avoid being rewritten by the web VPN, then the document.cookie object in the returned page will represent all of the user’s cookies for the web VPN domain. Included in this document.cookie are the web VPN session ID cookie itself and all globally unique cookies set by sites requested through the web VPN. The attacker may then use these cookies to hijack the user’s VPN session and all other sessions accessed through the web VPN that rely on cookies for session identification.
Additionally, an attacker could construct a page with two frames: one hidden and one that displays a legitimate intranet site. The hidden frame could log all keys pressed in the second, benign frame and submit these keypresses as parameters to a XMLHttpRequest GET to the attacker’s site, rewritten in web VPN syntax.
Note that if the VPN server is allowed to connect to arbitrary Internet sites, these vulnerabilities can be exploited by any site on the Internet.
Sun today released VirtualBox 3.1.0, a major update introducing teleportation, branched snapshots, 2D video acceleration for Windows guests, more flexible storage management and much more. See the ChangeLog for details.
The Koobface Web site offers a video posted by ‘SantA’. The usual ruse of requiring a codec to watch the video is used, to encourage the user to install and run a file called setup.exe (SHA1:a2046fc88ab82abec89e150b915ab4b332af924a). This file is currently detected by 16 out of 41 antivirus products according to VirusTotal.
On the compromised Facebook page the user is presented with a link to ch[removed]cher.ch which is a compromised site in Switzerland. The user is redirected to one of several Koobface Web sites through a malicious Flash movie file hosted on the compromised site. If the user runs the infected file, the worm will automatically login to their Facebook, Myspace, and several other social networking sites and send messages to all their friends.
Source:
http://securitylabs.websense.com/content/Alerts/3505.aspx
